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The world of international trade has evolved over the centuries and, with this process of evolution, unique 
challenges have emerged over time.  International trade, in essence, involves the movement of goods and 
services across borders; it is conducted mainly by private firms rather than governments. The suggested role of 
government is to create an environment that allows for efficient international trade. Such an environment is 
manifested in the provision of an adequate physical infrastructure and a transparent regulatory environment. 
Today, an organisation such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members direct the vast bulk of 
international trade, plays an active role in advancing the agenda of a rules-based international trade regime. 
This same organization also provides, on an ongoing basis, initiatives directed to improving the facilitation of 
trade internationally. Examples of trade facilitation initiatives are the recent Bali-Agreement (The Trade 
Facilitation Agreement, 2013), signed by WTO members in 2013 in Bali, and the Revised Kyoto Convention of 
the World Customs Organization (WCO) which has, as its objective, the elimination of barriers to efficient 
international trade.  
This dissertation focuses on customs penalty regime as utilised by South Africa. The South African regime is 
compared with certain foreign and international customs penalty regimes (in this case, Canada, the United 
States of America and the European Union). The study further explores the appeal system available to 
transgressors of these regimes.  The penalty – and appeal regimes is further analysed against 
recommendations and prescripts in international agreements to which these countries are parties, specifically 
the WTO Bali Agreement and the WCO Revised Kyoto Convention. A practical and transparent customs penalty 
regime will obviously support the agenda to improve trade facilitation, a situation that is desired by traders 
throughout the globe.  
From a South African perspective, it was found that the current customs penalty regime is rather complex and 
may not, therefore, effectively improve compliance with customs legislation. It would appear that the 
introduction of the Tax Administration Act No. 28 of 2011 in October 2012 in South Africa also resulted in a 
‘duopolistic’ system of penalty and appeal processes within SARS, given that this Act relates to the 
enforcement of the customs laws. The examination of the foreign customs penalty regimes showed systems 
that appear to be very practical, especially from the perspective of enforcement by a customs officer, 
compared with those regimes that are legalistic and that make the work of the customs officer potentially very 
complicated. For example, from a practical point of view and in line with the requirements of the Revised 
Kyoto Convention, the Administrative Monetary Penalty System applied by customs authorities in Canada 
appears to be considerably better than the regimes applied by the other countries under discussion in this 
dissertation.  The European Union is also moving towards implementing a similar system (i.e. similar to 
Canada’s system) but, to date, has failed to keep its system as practical as it could be.  The system utilised by 
the United States, on the other hand, is rather legalistic, and involves issues such as negligence, gross 
negligence and fraud to be proven before a customs contravention can be shown to have occurred.   
 
V 
In the fast-paced environment of contemporary international trade penalty regimes that are easily enforceable 
by customs officers and effectively deal with customs breaches are needed. It is submitted that this is best 
addressed in a broad administrative penalty system based on the legal requirement of strict liability, that is, 
regardless of fault. Serious transgressions must be dealt with by specialised units in the relevant criminal 
justice system and should not be the responsibility of the ordinary customs officer. In the South African 
context as well as beyond its borders in the region and even the continent, the discussion around customs 
penalty regimes is not receiving the attention it deserves. This does not auger well for the agenda of trade 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The collection of taxes is one of the world’s oldest professions, as we can see when we read the Bible itself. 
Over the centuries, tax collection has evolved into a sophisticated system on which governments rely to 
protect their domestic economy and to collect revenue. Alongside this system global trade systems have 
developed on which countries rely to regulate international trade. At the heart of each country’s trade system, 
which allows for the flow of goods across international borders, is the customs administration, staffed by what 
is commonly known as the customs official. An integral part of the job of a customs officer is to ensure 
compliance with the particular country’s domestic customs legislation and to enforce this legislation where 
breaches occur by meting out penalties and/or confiscating the implicated goods. 
In his book on the history of customs and tariffs, Asakura (2003) notes that the earliest confirmed existence of 
organised customs occurred during the time of the Egyptian Pharaohs. It is well documented that, during the 
period of classical Greece, a single rate of duty was applicable to all goods and was calculated as a percentage 
of the value of the goods (ad valorem). It is also a well-known fact that, under the Roman Empire, the activities 
associated with customs administration were already properly organised. Indeed, one of the most significant 
contributions to modern customs, by the Roman Empire, was the development of the customs tariff. This 
allowed for the collection of different rates of duties depending on the type of goods. The first listing of goods 
with different rates of duty was discovered in the oasis city of Palmyra in the Syrian desert, and dates to 18 
April 137 A.D. Today, we have the Harmonised System administered by the World Customs Organization 
(WCO), which consists of 97 chapters that cover all commodities with their respective tariff codes (Asakura, 
2003). In fact, to this day, tariffs still form the backbone of the international system in terms of which countries 
trade with each other. 
A particular interest of this work is the development of the customs enforcement regime over time. In this 
regard, Asakura (2003) highlights an ancient Indian text known as the Laws of Manu. This text lists, for 
example, customs transgressions such as trading outside of regulated times and the making of false 
statements, both of which were punishable with a fine eight times the value of the duty evaded. Interestingly, 
this is a penalty principle that is still widely used today. 
If we now move forward in time to the early 20
th
 century, it is clear that trade had become very complex in the 
intervening centuries. Indeed, this state of complexity was regarded, by many, as an indirect consequence of 
protection used by the various countries and one which, overall, was having a negative effect on lawful trade. 
The role of customs formalities in international trade had to be simplified in order to regulate international 
trade to the benefit of all concerned. A forerunner to establishing an entity that would regulate international 
trade came in the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade commonly referred to as GATT, of 1947. 
Following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, a deal (the Marrakesh Agreement) was struck in 1994 that 
led, in 1995, to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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The result was a rules-based international trading system that provided much needed certainty and freer 
trading conditions (Asakura, 2003).  A substantial part of this international trade regime is today concretised in 
the concept of “trade facilitation”, customs penalty regimes are but one aspect. The focus of this dissertation 
is to examine how these penalty regimes are implemented in the broader field of trade facilitation. Given that 
South Africa is a member of the WTO and WCO, it will also be worthwhile assessing to what extent South 
Africa complies with its international obligations.  In the Progress Office Machine case, much was made at 
paragraph 11 of the fact that our domestic legislation must be in line with our established international legal 
obligations (Progress Office Machines CC v SARS and Others, 2007).This was later again confirmed in the 
Glenister case at paragraph 97, where the “special place of international law” in our law was reiterated as 
required by the South African Constitution in sections 231 – 233 (Glenister v President of the RSA and Others, 
2011). 
The introduction of the Tax Administration Act,No.28 of 2011 (“TA Act”) in October 2012 prompted me, as a 
former customs official and currently as a customs legal advisor, to revisit the provisions that govern 
administrative penalties in the Customs and Excise Act, No. 91 of 1964 (“the Customs and Excise Act”). This 
was encouraged by the fact that, as one of its main purposes, the new TA Act sought to rationalise – in one 
piece of legislation – all administrative matters relating to all legislation administered by the South African 
Revenue Services (“SARS”). It is my observation that customs officials find the current administrative penalty 
regime, as prescribed by section 91 of the Customs and Excise Act, cumbersome to administer.  This section of 
the Act does not act as an effective deterrent for customs breaches, as will be explained in paragraph 2.3 
below. It is therefore surprising that, with the implementation of the TA Act, the Customs and Excise Act was 
excluded from its application as it could have assisted greatly in standardising the appeals regime, at least for 
the benefit of the SARS and taxpayers at large. Instead, and as part of its modernising efforts, SARS has for the 
past few years started to re-write the customs legislative regime, culminating in the adoption of the new 
Customs Control Act,No.31 of 2014 (“Customs Control Act”) and the Customs Duty Act,No.30 of 2014 
(“Customs Duty Act”). These Acts have not yet been promulgated and will be discussed below in an effort to 
see what new customs penalty regime is on the horizon for South Africa.  
A further focus of this study will therefore be to assess the penalty regime structure as provided for in the new 
TA Act as it pertains to the Value Added Tax Act,No.89 of 1991 (“VAT Act”) specifically. This regime will be 
compared with the penalty regime in the current Customs and Excise Act, and with the Customs Control Act 
and Customs Duty Act. This, in turn, will be contrasted with a study of selected foreign customs and excise 
penalty regimes structures (those of Canada, the United States of America and the European Union) with a 
view to identifying similarities and differences in relation to the South African customs penalty regime.  
The research focus is exploratory in nature. Very little material is locally available that deals with the matter 
discussed here. An additional objective of this dissertation is to add resource value to this field of study by 
explaining the current penalty regime as well as the proposed penalty regime in the new Customs Control Act  
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and Customs Duty Act. This will be compared with the TA Act and selected foreign customs penalty regimes. It 
is hoped that, from this relatively new conversation, issues will emerge that can be utilised when considering 



























Chapter 2 –Aim and objective of the study 
This study seeks to evaluate the SARS customs penalty regime in its current form under the Customs and 
Excise Act of 1964 in the light of new legislative developments; this regime will then be compared with a 
selection of customs penalty regimes that operate internationally. This evaluation and comparison will be done 
by a description, analysis and comparison of the relevant, primary domestic legal instruments with a selection 
of foreign and international primary legal instruments.  
 
The starting point of this dissertation is section 91 of the Customs and Excise Act, because it is this section of 
the Act that authorises the imposition of a so-called administrative penalty if any provision of the Act is 
breached. Section 91 has an interesting “twist” to it in that it makes the payment of the penalty voluntary: 
transgressors can elect to be dealt with administratively (i.e. by paying the penalty) or they may choose not to 
pay the penalty and thus open themselves up to possible criminal prosecution. However, criminal prosecution 
is not preferred by the SARS owing to the lack of internal capacity and the limited resources available to the 
National Prosecuting Authority (which would have to deal with a potentially high volume of cases). It is also 
logical that SARS will not choose to criminally prosecute each and every transgression simply because of the 
numbers involved as well as the varying levels of seriousness of the transgressions. In the light of this, the 
question arises: in dealing with customs contraventions, is SARS utilising the most effective legal scheme? 
 
The introduction of the TA Act in October 2012 added a new dimension to the customs penalty regime in the 
way the Act regulates the administration of all tax Acts for which SARS is responsible. One of the main 
objectives of the TA Act is to streamline all administrative matters relating to these tax Acts, of which the 
imposition of penalties and the administrative appeal process are two elements. In 2012, SARS decided not to 
make the TA Act applicable to the Customs and Excise Act; this decision may have resulted in a missed 
opportunity to synchronise the penalty and appeal regimes within SARS for all legislation administered by this 
authority. This dissertation therefore aims to highlight the current dissimilar approaches to the imposition of 
penalties and the handling of administrative appeals between two divisions within the one organisation, 
namely, SARS. 
 
A further aim of this study is to determine whether there are any lessons to be learnt internationally from 
other customs authorities that could lead to the improvement of South Africa’s domestic penalty regime. To 
this end, three international regimes have been chosen,  including Canada, given the influence of Canada’s  
constitution and jurisprudence on the development of the new South African democratic order (during the 
1990s and ever since). The two other regimes chosen are that of the European Union, which was developed 
but not yet implemented and that of the United States of America. America was chosen due to its historically 
dominant role in international trade, although this domination is now being rivalled by countries such as China 
and the economic block of the European Union.  
5 
Since this is a qualitative study, the research criteria will be supported by the fact that: 
a) the concepts dealt with in this study relating to customs penalty regimes can be transferred from the South 
African context to the regional, continental and international spheres because of the universality of the 
concepts involved (transferability); 
b) the information or data that will be used is readily available and if analysed by any other scholar the 
outcomes are likely to be similar (dependability); 
c) the study has a clear audit trail of the process applied and information analysed (confirmability); and  
d) various sources of information were used to improve the credibility of the outcomes of this study 
(authenticity). 
 
As indicated above, the information sources mainly consist of primary legislation, manuals and directives. The 
focus is on the prescribed penalty regimes and on the administrative appeal remedies available to alleged 
transgressors of selected countries. The main sources of information were the following: 
 
a) Domestic legislation: 
The Constitution of South Africa of 1996 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No.3 of 2000 
The Customs and Excise Act, No.91 of 1964 
The Customs Control Act, No.31 of 2014 
The Customs Duty Act, No.43 of 2014 
The Tax Administration Act, No.28 of 2011 
The Value Added Tax Act, No.89 of 1991 
 
b) Foreign legislation: 
Canada: Canadian Customs Act 1986. 
The United States of America: USA Tariff Act of 1930. 
 
c) Other: 
European Union: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Union legal framework for 
customs infringements and sanctions (COM2013 884 final) Brussels, Switzerland 
 
d) International agreements: 
World Trade Organization: The Trade Facilitation Agreement of 2014 
World Customs Organization: Revised Kyoto Convention 
e) Regional Agreements 
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Southern African Development Community: The SADC Protocol on Trade 
Southern African Customs Union: The SACU Agreement 
 
In order to support the dependability of this comparative study, it was essential to use primary sources, since 
these sources best reveal the structures which form the subject of this study. The study was further supported 
by policy documents, available independent writings, and relevant court rulings. 
The body of the dissertation consists of four main chapters, each of which addresses a specific research 
subject: 
 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Analysis 
This chapter provides a review of the literature consulted on the relevant subject matter; this literature 
covered international and domestic legislation. Literature that provided insight into the chosen foreign 
customs penalty regimes was also consulted. 
 
Chapter 4 – Results of the Study 
In this chapter, the researcher analyses the results of the study in order to clarify the issues involved.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 – Discussion and Conclusion 
In chapter 5, the findings of the research are discussed and in chapter 6 recommendations are made regarding 

















Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Analysis 
Given the nature of the sources consulted, it was considered correct to provide a more comprehensive picture 
of what the respective sources offer rather than fragment the discussion. On the topic of this work, that is, 
customs administrative penalties, there is a dearth of academic literature. The standard work on the history of 
customs and tariffs by Hironori Asakura offers interesting historical and some comparative insights (Asakura, 
2003). There are also, globally, plenty of official documents on customs penalty regimes (in electronic format).  
The literature review and analysis are therefore confined to the systems covered by this research. 
3.1 International Context 
At an international level, various systems have been developed by the WTO and WCO to promote the 
standardisation of various aspects of trade facilitation, including enforcement methods and customs penalty 
regime frameworks. These international legal instruments therefore merit specific attention. 
3.1.1 WTO –the Bali Agreement 
 In December 2013, in Bali, WTO members reached an important milestone by concluding the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement. The preamble of the Agreement sets out a clear vision, which is, firstly, to improve the 
movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. Secondly, the aim of the Agreement is 
to provide support to, especially, least-developed countries (LDCs) and, thirdly, the Agreement aims to 
promote cooperation amongst WTO members on issues of trade facilitation and customs compliance (The 
Trade Facilitation Agreement, 2013). 
This Agreement emphasises the accessibility of information and requires, in Article 1.1 (g) and (h), its members 
to publish information on penalty provisions for breaches of import, export or transit formalities and to publish 
information on appeal procedures. The availability of this information, it is suggested, will assist traders in 
being aware of what specifically constitutes a breach of a particular customs law and, if the traders find 
themselves in breach of such laws, an understanding of the remedies available to them.  Articles 1.2 and 1.3 
are, furthermore, very specific in terms of information platforms that must be utilised to improve accessibility 
(e.g.  the internet and enquiry points at customs offices).  
 
Article 4 specifies the minimum requirements for appeal or review procedures where a customs administrative 
decision is meted out to a trader. Footnote 4 on page 5 of the Agreement defines an administrative decision as 
“a decision with a legal effect that affects rights and obligations of a specific person in an individual case. It 
shall be understood that an administrative decision in this Article covers an administrative action within the 
meaning of Article X of the GATT 1994 or failure to take an administrative action or decision as provided for in a 
Member's domestic law and legal system. For addressing such failure, Members may maintain an alternative 
administrative mechanism or judicial recourse to direct the customs authority to promptly issue an  
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administrative decision in place of the right to appeal or review  ...”(The Trade Facilitation Agreement, 2013, 
p.5). In short, Article 4 requires that, where an administrative decision has been taken, the trader must have 
the option of an internal administrative appeal or review process. This process must of course be administered 
by officials who were not party to the original decision in order to promote independent decision-making. If 
such an internal process is not available, the option of judicial appeal or review must be available to the trader. 
This is surprising because the speedier and more cost effective option of an internal administrative appeal or 
review should have been stipulated as a prerequisite instead of an option between internal appeal or review 
and judicial appeal or review.  
 
In the context of this work, the specific mention of penalties in Article 6.3 and the requirements proposed in 
relation to these penalties are of particular importance. Article 6 goes under the heading of “General 
Disciplines on Fees and Charges Imposed on or in Connection with Importation and Exportation”. Article 6.3.1 
defines "penalties" to mean “those imposed by a Member's customs administration for a breach of the 
Member's customs law, regulation, or procedural requirement” (The Trade Facilitation Agreement, 2013, 
p.7).The underlying fundamental principles governing penalties propagated in the Agreement include the 
following: 
 they are only to be imposed on those who committed the breach 
 specific circumstances must be considered in arriving at a penalty which should “fit the crime” 
 measures must be in place to ensure segregation of duties to avoid conflict between the assessment 
of penalties and the collection thereof 
 reasons must be provided for the penalty assessment citing the applicable law contravened and how 
the decision on the penalty amount was reached  
 voluntary disclosures of breaches must be considered as a mitigating factor where appropriate (The 
Trade Facilitation Agreement, 2013, p.7) 
The above requirements resemble much which is already prescribed in South African administrative law and 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
After some initial disagreement between certain countries regarding particular aspects of the Trade 
Facilitation Agreement, consensus was finally reached towards the end of 2014 and a decision was taken to 
insert the new Agreement into Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement. This now paves the way for the entering into 
force of this Agreement once two-thirds of WTO members have finalised their respective domestic ratification 
processes. 
3.1.2 WCO – the Revised Kyoto Convention 
 
The International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures (“Kyoto 
Convention”) was revised in 1999 and came into force in February 2006. As with The Trade Facilitation  
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Agreement, the Convention has, as its main objective, the provision of predictability and efficiency in the 
international trade arena. Contracting parties, of which South Africa is one, are bound by the rules set out in 
the Convention.  The provision of easily accessible processes of administrative and judicial review is one such 
requirement, and this will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
To understand the Revised Kyoto Convention it is important to first explain its structure as set out in Article 4. 
The convention consists mainly of: 
a) the General Annexes and 
b) the Specific Annexes 
The annexes are further divided into chapters which consist of definitions, standards, transitional standards, 
recommended practices and guidelines. (Revised Kyoto Convention, 1999). 
In the General Annexes that apply to all contracting parties, the Convention provides, inter alia, for the 
following standards concerning decisions made by a customs authority, standards that are relevant to this 
dissertation:  
 When a decision is made that adversely affects a trader, reasons must be provided as well as an 
indication of the right to appeal such a decision (Standard 9.8 in the General Annex (chapter 9)). 
 National legislation must provide for an initial appeal to the customs authority. This indicates that an 
internal appeal process must be provided for (Standard 10.4 in the General Annex (chapter 10)). 
 When the internal appeal is unsuccessful, provision must be made for a further appeal to a body 
independent of the customs authority (Standard 10.5 in the general annex (chapter 10)), and 
 When standards 10.4 and 10.5 had been exhausted, the appellant will have the right to judicial appeal 
or review (Standard 10.6 in the general annex (chapter 10)). 
In the Specific Annexes (compliance with which is optional, if a contracting party has not adopted a Specific 
Annex), chapter H deals specifically with offences and provides clear guidelines to customs regimes regarding 
the administration of customs offences. The definitions section sets an interesting tone by introducing terms 
or concepts such as "administrative settlement of a customs offence" and "compromise settlement". These 
concepts indicate an avenue designed to speedily resolve customs contraventions, either by means of 
settlement or compromise settlement. Settlement is done via a customs ruling, while a compromise 
settlement is done via an agreement subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by those in breach of a 
customs legal provision (Revised Kyoto Convention, 1999). 
 
Specific Annex H is fairly extensive and consists of some 27 standards and recommended practices in toto 
under the following headings, practices which must be provided for in a country’s domestic legislation: 
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Field of application 
National legislation must clearly indicate the chain of liability as it relates to customs procedures (standard 3) 
and specify the period of liability by indicating when it starts and when it ends (standard 4). This suggests that 
customs offences can only be investigated within a specified period of time, where after the liability in terms 
of undetected breaches will cease.  
Investigation and establishment of customs offences 
The powers of customs officers must be spelled out clearly to avoid abuse (standard 5), especially as these 
relate to the searching of persons (standard 6). The searching of premises must be controlled and be subject to 
certain legal requirements (chapter 7) and, where breaches are discovered, all relevant administrative law 
requirements must be adhered to in the communication to the suspected transgressor (standard 8).  
Procedure to be followed when a customs offence is discovered 
Legislation should be clear on the procedures to be followed when a breach has been discovered, as well as 
the possible consequences for the transgressor (standard 9). Particulars of customs breaches should be clearly 
set out, as well as the implications of such breaches for the transgressor (recommended practice 10). 
Seizure or detention of the goods or means of transport 
Goods and/or means of transport must only be seized by customs if they are liable to forfeiture or required in 
further legal proceedings (standard 11). Only those goods in a consignment directly implicated in an offence 
may be detained or seized (standard 12). Some type of notice must be provided to the owner of the goods 
indicating the description of the goods, the reason for detention or seizure, and the nature of the 
transgression (standard 13). 
Further recommended practices relating to the seizure or detention of the goods or means of transport 
include: 
 Release of goods against security if possible (standard14). 
 Means of transport should be released if not specially adapted for concealment and not required as 
evidence (standard15). 
 Means of transport should only be forfeited to the state if the owner had knowledge of the offence or 
did not take adequate precautions (standard16);  and 
 If the item in question does not consist of perishable goods, or if the item is not impractical for 





Detention of persons 
Clear guidelines must be specified when dealing with the detention of persons (standard 18). 
Administrative settlement of customs offences 
As soon as a customs breach has been discovered, processes should be initiated to speedily settle the matter 
administratively by providing the terms of the settlement and the appeal processes available to the alleged 
transgressor (standard 19). Minor offences in relation to goods (recommended practice 20), or minor offences 
committed by travellers (recommended practice 21) should be dealt with there and then by the relevant 
office. 
Requirement 22 is of particular importance as far as practicality and transparency are concerned.  This 
requirement specifies that categories of offences, including the specific administrative penalty, should be 
published. The level of seriousness of the offence and the history of the transgressor must always be in 
proportion to the penalty amount (standard 23). When imposing penalties, factors to be considered include 
the steps that were taken by the transgressor (standard 24), as well as consequences linked to force majeure 
(standard 25). Where a matter has been settled which involves detained or seized goods, such goods must be 
returned to the trader if not already forfeited or abandoned to the state (standard 26). 
Right of appeal 
An alleged transgressor must have the right to appeal to a body independent of customs unless the parties 
have entered into a compromise settlement (standard 27). 
 
3.1.3 The SADC Protocol on Trade 
South Africa is also a member of the Southern African Development Community and of the SADC Protocol on 
Trade (“the Trade Protocol”), which was signed in Maseru in 1996 and amended in Windhoek in August 2000. 
The Trade Protocol has attached to it various annexes dealing with, inter alia, rules of origin, customs 
cooperation, trade documentation and procedures, transit trade and transit facilities, as well as trade 
development. Closer scrutiny of the Trade Protocol and its annexes indicates no reference or strategy 
concerning the issue of customs offences, penalties or appeal procedures. 
3.1.4 The SACU Agreement 
In Southern Africa we have the oldest customs union in the world, the Southern African Customs Union 
(“SACU”), which came into existence in 1910.  Current Members are Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland and Lesotho. As a customs union, these Members have a common external tariff regime and no 
customs duties apply to intra union trade (SACU Agreement, 2002, Article 18.1). As in the SADC Trade Protocol, 
the SACU Agreement contains no reference to a recommended standard on customs offences, penalties or 
appeal procedures. 
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3.2 Overview of South Africa’s domestic legislative framework 
It is clear from the provisions of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (2013) and the Revised Kyoto 
Convention (2000) that Member states are expected to create a trade environment that is predictable and fair, 
since this environment relates to the imposition of penalties for the breach of customs laws and regulations. 
Unfortunately, the SADC Trade Protocol and the SACU Agreement place little emphasis on the administration 
of customs breaches, which does not bode well for trade facilitation in the region. 
It is important to examine the legislative framework within which the administration of customs breaches 
must operate in South Africa, with specific reference to the Constitution of 1996 (because all legislation must 
be aligned to the legal principles contained in the Constitution).  
3.2.1 The Constitution of South Africa of 1996 
In terms of section 2 of the Constitution, law or conduct which is incompatible with the Constitution is invalid. 
This section further requires that the obligations imposed by the Constitution must be fulfilled. Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution contains a highly praised bill of fundamental rights. The protected rights go beyond classical 
rights and freedoms to include a number of socio-economic rights and other  rights not usually found in a bill 
of rights: the right to information and the right to administrative justice are examples of the latter 
(Constitution, sections 32 and 33) (Currie & de Waal, The Bill of Rights Handbook, 2005) 
 
Section 33 contains the fundamental right to just administrative action. The corollary of this right is a duty on 
the part of the state to act in the required manner and to provide reasons for prejudicial administrative 
actions. Section 33 stipulates very clearly what “just administrative action” entails and the requirements to be 
met: action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. It makes it clear that reasons must be provided 
where an administrative action affects someone’s rights. 
 
Section 33 of the Constitution further requires national legislation by Parliament to provide for three matters: 
the first is review of administrative action by a court or tribunal; the second is place the state under a duty to 
give full effect to all aspects of the right to just administrative action; and the third is to promote efficient state 
administration. 
 
The right to “just administrative action” is supported by other rights in the Bill of Rights such as section 34, 
which stipulates that disputes be settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum The right to “just administrative action” is also supported by section 32, which 
allows for access to information held by the state, and section 38, which allows for the enforcement of these 
rights (Hoexter, 2012). The rights conferred on natural or juristic persons as they relate to decisions taken by 
government that affect them directly are comprehensive and therefore require executive action which is  
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transparent and sensitive to such rights. Reference should also be made to section 195 of the Constitution, 
which contains an extensive set of basic values and principles governing public administration. These principles 
are often overlooked in debates about the state of executive action in South Africa. 
 
The national legislation that gives practical effect to Article 33 of the Constitution is the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act,No.3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).  
 
3.2.2 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act no.3 of 2000 
The preamble of PAJA sets out its clear purpose in support of section 33 of the Constitution, viz.:  
 to promote efficient administration and good governance, 
 to create a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration or in the 
exercise of a public power or the performance of a public function, and  
 to give effect to the right of just administrative action. 
 
The key concept, upon which PAJA turns, is “administrative action”. PAJA defines “administrative action” in 
section 1 as any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by an organ of state when exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, and which adversely affects the 
rights of any person while having a direct, external legal effect. The meting out of administrative penalties and 
adverse assessments of tax of a trader by SARS will clearly fall within this definition of administrative action. 
 
Section 3(2) of the PAJA requires that the administrative action must be procedurally fair and the process must 
include the following elements:  
(a) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;  
(b) reasonable opportunity to make representations;  
(c) clear statement of the administrative action;  
(d) adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable; and  
(e) adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5.  
 
In terms of section 5, written reasons for an administrative action may be requested within 90 days after the 
person became aware of the action, if no reasons have yet been provided. Any person may institute 
proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial review of an administrative action in terms of section 6. 
These two provisions provide a clear set of rules and framework with which administrative action taken by 
government officials must comply, and the remedies available to the affected person or entity. 
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As an organ of state, the SARS must adhere to the principles of just administrative action as contained in PAJA. 
This implies that the customs laws administered by SARS must comply with the spirit of just administrative 
action as prescribed in section 33 of the Constitution. The aforementioned principle should then easily support 
the agenda of trade facilitation as enumerated above in conjunction with the guidelines contained in the 
Revised Kyoto Convention and the intentions of the Bali Agreement. It is evident that the South African legal 
system supports transparent and effective government action in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and in 
terms of PAJA more specifically, which bodes well for international trade. 
In order to ensure fair administration of matters pertaining to international trade, discretionary powers should 
not be unlimited. Hoexter (2012) distinguishes between three groups of administrative powers: 
1) Express or implied – express powers are required to support the actions of officials as provided for clearly in 
legislation whilst implied powers will generally be a consequence of an express power. 
2) Discretionary or mechanical – discretionary powers are evident in wording such as “may”, which indicates 
that the official has a choice (whereas mechanical powers leaves no real choice to the official). Burns (2013) 
also indicates that officials generally have a “free choice within the limits set by the law” when they exercise 
discretionary powers. In this study it is argued that the limits set by the law must always be respected if the 
customs penalty regime is to be fair and transparent. 
3) Mandatory or directory – as the wording indicates, the legislative requirement(s) is peremptory in nature. 
In the Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs case, the court observed that discretionary powers are essential in 
any legal system. This case dealt with the granting of immigration permits which are considered by officials of 
the Department of Home Affairs based on the specific circumstances of the applicant(s). Although 
discretionary powers cannot be omitted totally in any legal system, the Dawood case and the comments of the 
judge (in paragraph 53) indicate the extent of the care required to avoid abuse of the granted power (Dawood 
and Another v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others, 2000(3)). In the environment of international trade, 
where traders require that matters be concluded quickly, and where there is a need for predictability and 
certainty, a clear penalty system (as found in the Canadian customs regime and discussed below) is obviously 
the preferred option. 
3.2.3 Tax Administration Act, No.28 of 2011 
The Tax Administration Act, No.28 of 2011 (the “TA Act”), was promulgated on 1 August 2012. The main 
function of this Act is to consolidate the administration aspect of all Acts administered by SARS, with the 
exclusion of the Customs and Excise Act. Despite the exclusion, the TA Act remains important from a Customs  
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point of view since it sets the benchmark within SARS as to how certain matters are to be dealt with 
administratively.  The Customs Division within SARS is linked to the TA Act through the collection of Value 
Added Tax (“VAT”) on imported goods. The question therefore arises: are customs officers obliged to apply 
two sets of rules to a specific import transaction as a result of a possible unintended dualistic approach to 
administrative appeals and the imposition of penalties within SARS? This issue will be clarified below in the 
discussion on customs-related administrative appeals and the imposition of a penalties regime. 
 
The focus in this section will be on chapter 9 of the TA Act, which deals with dispute resolution, and chapter 
15, which deals with administrative non-compliance penalties and the rules governing this as published in 
Government Gazette no. 37819 of 11 July 2014. The TA Act makes provision for various steps and remedies 
where a taxpayer does not agree with an assessment or decision imposed by SARS: 
 
Step 1 – Objection (section 104): – the aggrieved taxpayer can lodge an objection first, this is not yet an 
appeal. 
Step 2 – Appeal (section 107): – an appellant has now three possible avenues open where he/she does not 
agree with the outcome of the objection process. The option taken will depend on the appellant’s choice of 
dispute-resolving channel or the amount involved. In the appeal application, the appellant can indicate that 
he/she opts that the matter be dealt with through the alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) process (section 
107(5)). SARS must, however, agree to this selection. The second option is to refer the matter to the Tax Board 
(tax in dispute is less than R200 000), and the third option is to refer the matter to the Tax Court (tax in dispute 
is in excess of R200 000). The Tax Board is presided over by an attorney or advocate (section 110(1)(a)) while 
the Tax Court is presided over by a judge of the High Court of South Africa (section 118(1)(a)).   
 
Step 3 – De novo hearing: if the appellant or SARS is dissatisfied with the Tax Board’s decision, the matter may 
be referred to the Tax Court for a de novo hearing (section 115(1)).The decision of the Tax Court can be 
appealed to the provincial division of the High Court or to the Supreme Court of Appeal under specific 
conditions (section 133(2)). An appellant has therefore at least two opportunities to raise his/her case 
administratively before having to go to an external judicial appeal or review. 
 
As mentioned earlier, even though the Customs and Excise Act is excluded at this stage from the operation of 
the TA Act, customs officers are still required to apply the TA Act in part as they collect VAT, which is covered 
by the TA Act. For this reason it is also prudent to consider how penalties related to VAT are administered and 
to consider the accessible remedies (as provided for in chapter 15 of the TA Act). 
 
In terms of section 213 of the TA Act, a percentage-based penalty must be imposed where an underpayment 
of tax has occurred. This percentage is prescribed in the relevant tax Act (e.g. VAT Act) and will be calculated 
against the amount underpaid to SARS. In the case of a VAT underpayment, the percentage will be 10%, as  
16 
prescribed in section 39(4) of the VAT Act. The TA Act prescribes the procedure for imposing the penalty as 
well as the remedies available to the transgressor. As far as remedies are concerned, the following scheme is 
prescribed: 
 
Step 1 – Request remittance of the penalty (section 215):  this not an appeal. 
The TA Act provides for the factors to be considered when deciding to remit a penalty in part or not in 
accordance with sections 217(3) and 218. Section 217(3) provides for three factors to be considered for 
nominal or first incidence breaches, viz. (i) a first incidence of non-compliance or if the amount involved is less 
than R2000.00; (ii) reasonable grounds for the breach to exist; and (iii) the breach has been remedied. Section 
218(2) provides for the factors that must be present (one or more to be present) to consider remittance in part 
or in whole: 
(a) a natural or human-made disaster; 
(b) a civil disturbance or disruption in services; 
(c) a serious illness or accident; 
(d) serious emotional or mental distress; 
(e) any of the following acts by SARS: 
(i) a capturing error; 
(ii) a processing delay; 
(iii) provision of incorrect information in an official publication or media release issued by the Commissioner; 
(iv) delay in providing information to any person; or 
(v) failure by SARS to provide sufficient time for an adequate response to a request for information by SARS; 
(f) serious financial hardship, such as— 
(i) in the case of an individual, lack of basic living requirements; or 
(ii) in the case of a business, an immediate danger that the continuity of business operations and the 
continued employment of its employees are jeopardised; or 
(g) any other circumstance of analogous seriousness. 
 
Step 2 –Objection and Appeal (section 220):  If the taxpayer is not satisfied with the outcome of the request of 
remittance, he/she can utilise the objection and appeal process as described above and provided for in chapter 
9 of the TA Act. Where a VAT penalty was imposed by SARS, a taxpayer has therefore at least three 
opportunities to raise his/her case administratively before having to go to external judicial appeal or review. 
 
The appeal and penalty process in the TA Act will be considered below and be compared with the process 
available where a customs penalty is applied in terms of the Customs and Excise Act. 
 
3.3 South Africa’s customs legislative framework 
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3.3.1 The Customs and Excise Act, No.91 of 1964 
The Customs and Excise Act was enacted in 1964 long before South Africa’s new democratic constitutional 
state came into being in 1994.The 1964 Act may therefore be open to constitutional challenges on many 
aspects, a point that was evident in the Constitutional Court case of Gaertner v SARS adjudicated in late 2013 
(Gaertner and Others v Minister of Finance and Others, 2013). Now that the parliamentary legislative process 
is complete, in the near future, three new Acts will be promulgated that will replace this pre-1994 piece of 
legislation. These three Acts will be discussed below. 
 
At the centre of the penalty regime in the current Act is section 91, which reads as follows: 
 
Section 91 administrative penalties. (1) (a) If any person—  
(i) has contravened any provision of this Act or failed to comply with any such provision with which it was his duty to 
comply; and  
(ii) agrees to abide by the Commissioner’s decision; and  
(iii) deposits with the Commissioner such sum as the Commissioner may require of him but not exceeding the maximum fine 
which may be imposed upon a conviction for the contravention or failure in question or makes such arrangements or 
complies with such conditions with regard to securing the payment of such sum as the Commissioner may require, the 
Commissioner may, after such enquiry as he deems necessary, determine the matter summarily and may, without 
legal proceedings, order forfeiture by way of penalty of the whole or any part of the amount so deposited or 
secured. 
(b) Anything done for the purposes of paragraph (a) by an agent generally or specially authorized thereto by any person 
shall be deemed to have been duly done by that person in terms of that paragraph. (2). . . . . .  
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) of section sixty-two, the imposition of a penalty under subsection (1) shall not 
be regarded as a conviction in respect of a criminal offence, but no prosecution for the relevant offence shall thereafter be 
competent. 
 (4) Nothing in this section shall in any way affect liability to forfeiture of goods or payment of duty or other charges 
thereon. 
 
Looking at the above provision holistically, it appears to be a rather involved process. The easy part implies 
that, if any provision of the Act is contravened, SARS can impose a section 91 administrative penalty (section 
91(1)(a)(i)). The transgressor must then indicate to SARS whether he/she is willing to accept this process 
(section 91(1)(a)(ii)). This choice must then be indicated by the transgressor by him or her paying an amount 
upfront (section 91(1)(a)(iii)) and by utilising a form called a DA70 (Application to make a provisional payment). 
At this stage, the penalty is not yet confirmed and the payment is only regarded as an amount in lieu of a 
possible penalty. The Commissioner must then hold an enquiry to decide whether the whole or part of the 
amount deposited by the transgressor must be forfeited as a penalty. Only after this “enquiry” has been 
concluded is an amount now confirmed as a penalty. 
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No clear guidelines are available to the transgressor to indicate the possible penalty amount due for the 
specific breach as required in standard 9 of the Revised Kyoto Convention. Furthermore, in terms of section 
91(3), if the transgressor chose the above option, SARS will not be entitled to embark on any criminal 
proceedings against the transgressor as “no prosecution for the relevant offence shall thereafter be 
competent”. However, the payment of a section 91 penalty will not neutralise the right of SARS to take the 
goods involved in the transgression by way of forfeiture or to absolve the transgressor from paying any 
outstanding duty due or charges incurred relating to the goods in question (section 91(4)).  
 
Thus, in theory, if goods to the value of R100 000.00 are the subject matter of a customs transgression the 
following penalties could be imposed:  
a) a section 91 penalty (calculated as a percentage of the duty not paid); 
b) payment of duties and VAT and possible interest on outstanding duty and VAT; 
c) if the goods are missing, a section 88(2) amount equal to the customs value of the goods; or 
d) if the goods are available, possible forfeiture of the goods to the state – goods can then be “bought” back 
from the state in terms of section 93 at a rate of between 0% to 100% of the customs value of the goods. 
 
Calling for penalties must, of course, follow proper PAJA prescribed procedures simply so that the process is 
procedurally fair.  
 
From the discussion above, it is evident that the section 91 process is intricate. This fact of intricacy may well 
mean that the process is prone to procedural deficiencies. Section 91 cannot be read in isolation and must at 
least be read together with sections 87, 88 and 4(8A). Section 4(8A) empowers customs officers to detain 
(stop) goods for inspection upon entering South Africa before the goods reaches the client, whereas sections 
88(1)(a) and 88(1)(c) empowers SARS to detain and seize goods wherever they are found within the South 
African borders. Section 87 provides that, if it is found that any provisions of the Customs and Excise Act has 
indeed been contravened, the goods involved in that transaction and the means of transport can be seized and 
forfeited to the state.                                                              
                                                              
If criminal prosecution is contemplated by SARS, the courts are guided by sections 78 to 84 regarding the type 
of contravention and the sentence and fine that can be meted out on conviction. Offences not expressly 
mentioned (section 78) can carry a fine of up to R8000.00 or treble the value of the goods, whichever is the 
greater, and a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years. The most serious offences (section 84), on the 
other hand, can carry a fine of up to R40 000.00 or treble the value of the goods, whichever is the greater, and 
a term of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years. These monetary criminal sanctions must also be considered 
when customs officers determine a section 91 administrative penalty, since such penalty amount may not 
exceed the maximum fine limit (section 91(1)(a)(iii)) that a court of law can impose. 
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As far as the remedies available are concerned, the following scheme is provided for in chapter XA and the 
prescribed rules (Rules 77A to H) to the Customs and Excise Act: 
 
Step 1 - Appeal 
In terms of Rule 77H.04, a trader may appeal against a customs officer’s decision to an appeal committee 
authorised in the rules. Rule 77H.08 makes provision for various appeal committees, depending on where the 
decision was taken in the Customs Division, the amount involved, and the nature of the matter in question. 
These appeal committees can be listed as follows:  
 
(i) Branch Office Appeal Committee (Rule 77H.09) – the collective amount to which the appeal relates does not 
exceedR5 million (also referred to as the “Internal Administrative Appeal Committee”). 
(ii) Regional Office Appeal Committee (Rule 77H.10)– the collective amount in respect of the appeal does not 
exceed R8 million. 
(iii) Customs Operations Appeal Committee (Rule 77H.11) – may decide against a decision of an officer 
employed within the Customs Operations Unit or the excise unit, where the collective amount in respect of 
any such appeal does not exceedR10 million. 
 (iv) Enforcement and Risk Appeal Committee (Rule 77H.12) – may decide an appeal against a decision of any 
officer acting under the control or direction of the General Manager: Enforcement and Risk. 
(v) Customs National Appeal Committee (Rule 77H.13) – may decide any appeal– 
(a) against a decision of the Head: Customs Operations Unit, 
(b) against a decision of the Head of Excise Product and Process, 
(c) against a decision of an officer employed within the tariff or valuation division in Head Office,  
(d) against a decision of the General Manager: Enforcement and Risk, 
(e) where the collective amount to which the appeal relates exceeds R10 million, or 
(f) any such other appeal as the Commissioner may direct. 
 
All the above mentioned committees are appeal bodies of first instance and the appellant has therefore just 
one opportunity to an administrative appeal. 
Step 2 – Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
If the trader is not satisfied with the outcome of the appeal committee, he/she may refer the matter for ADR. 
Again, if the trader is not satisfied with the outcome of the ADR, the next option is judicial review or appeal. 
Where the matter involves a customs decision, the trader therefore has recourse to two internal 
administrative forums. 
 
3.3.2 The Customs Control Act, No.31 of 2014 
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During the past five years, SARS, and specifically the Customs Division, has embarked on a major 
modernisation process in order to become a more effective trade facilitator, more conscious of risk, and in 
order to comply more fully with international obligations. As the Customs and Excise Act, No.91 of 1964, is a 
relatively old piece of legislation, the need was identified to rewrite it to be more constitutionally compliant, 
easier to read, and so that it incorporated all international obligations required in a modern customs 
administration. The result of this exercise was, during the latter part of 2013, the introduction in Parliament of 
three Customs Bills that subsequently became the following Acts:  
a) the Customs Control Act,No.45 of 2013 (“Control Act”); 
b) the Customs Duty Act,No.43 of 2013 (“Duty Act”) and 
c) the Customs and Excise Amendment Bill,No.44 of 2013 (which is, in effect,  the  remainder of the 1964 
Act) 
The President of South Africa assented to the Customs Control Act on 23 July 2014 (Government Gazette 
no.37862, 2014) and the Customs Duty Act on 10 July 2014 (Government Gazette no.37821, 2014). At the time 
of writing neither of these Acts was yet effective; however, their likely impact needs to be assessed. 
What is immediately striking about the Customs Control Act is its immense size of 41 chapters (compared with 
12 chapters of the 1964 Act) and 944 sections (the 1964 Act contained only 122).  For the purpose of this work, 
chapter 39 (administrative penalties) and chapter 40 (judicial matters) will specifically be considered. 
Section 874 of the Control Act introduces five types of administrative penalties, viz.:  
(a) fixed amount penalties; 
(b) prosecution avoidance penalties; 
(c) termination of seizure penalties; 
(d) withdrawal of confiscation penalties and 
(e) missing goods penalties. 
Depending on the circumstances of the breach, there are three possible consequences for the transgressor as 
enumerated in section 875:  
(a) if it is non-prosecutable breach, a fixed amount penalty will be issued or 
(b) if a prosecutable breach, a prosecution avoidance penalty  can be issued or a charge can be laid for the 
institution of criminal proceedings for the breach. 
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A distinction is made between non-prosecutable breaches which results in a fixed amount penalty (set out in 
the table below), and a prosecutable breach that creates two possibilities. To avoid prosecution one can pay a 
penalty or else criminal proceedings can be instituted. The prosecution avoidance penalty appears to be 
similar to the current section 91 optional penalty provided for in the Customs and Excise Act. A list of non-
prosecutable breaches must still be published in a government gazette. 
Section 876(2) provides for the four broad categories of non-prosecutable breaches and their penalty 
amounts; these have been significantly (50%) reduced compared with the penalty amounts that first appeared 
in the Customs Control Bill before it became an Act. 
 
Fixed amount penalties for non-prosecutable breaches 
Category of breach Amount of penalty 
Category A Maximum of R2500 
Category B R5000 
Category C R7500 
Category D R10 000 
  
 
Section 877 further stipulates the procedure for imposing a fixed amount penalty and introduces a new concept 
of a written warning for Category A breaches as an alternative to a fixed amount penalty. For the purpose of 
section 876(3), the warning must be regarded as a fixed amount penalty as far as recording purposes are 
concerned.  
It appears that, when considering imposing a prosecution avoidance penalty, the officers need only to rely on a 
type of database of transgressions and not necessarily take into consideration the brevity of the breach. This 
exercise involves merely considering the number of previous breaches by a specific client. Section 878(2) 
provides for the circumstances where the prosecution avoidance penalty cannot be applied.  






 Disqualification criterion 
Scenario 1 On two separate occasions paid a prosecution 
avoidance penalty for a Category 1 offence and - 
within a period of five years from the date of 
payment of the penalty on the first occasion again 
becomes liable to prosecution for a Category 1 
offence. 
Scenario 2 On three separate occasions paid a prosecution 
avoidance penalty for a Category 2 offence and - 
within a period of five years from the date of 
payment of the penalty on the first occasion again 
becomes liable to prosecution for a Category 2 
offence. 
Scenario 3 On three separate occasions paid a prosecution 
avoidance penalty for any offence in terms of this Act 
and - within a period of five years from the date of 
payment of the penalty on the first occasion again 
becomes liable to prosecution for an offence in terms 




For the above system to be successful, it will require an effective and up-to-date database of all breaches that 
have occurred for each client.  
 
Section 879 deals with the procedure for imposing prosecution avoidance penalties for a prosecutable breach. 
Here SARS offers the transgressor an opportunity to avoid criminal prosecution by paying the prosecution 
avoidance penalty before or on a predetermined date. These penalties may not exceed the maximum fine a 
court may impose upon conviction and they indemnify the transgressor against prosecution. This is a similar 
regime to the current section 91 penalty process of the Customs and Excise Act. 
Sections 881 and 882 deal further with penalties that can be imposed on the termination of seizure of goods 
(penalty not to exceed the customs value of the goods), withdrawal of confiscation of goods (penalty not to 
exceed the customs value of the goods) and on goods that are missing at the time the breach was discovered 
(penalty equal to the customs value of the goods). These provisions are similar to the current sections 93 and 
88(2) of the Customs and Excise Act.  
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Chapter 37 of the Control Act deals with the reconsideration of decisions made by a customs officer and 
dispute resolution. Section 825 makes it clear that the option is available for internal administrative 
reconsideration of decisions and possible settlement of disputes. Decisions may be confirmed, altered or 
repealed by the Commissioner of SARS, the official who took the decision, by the supervisor of the official who 
took the decision, or on request by the aggrieved party (section 826(a)). Section 826(b) further provides that a 
decision can be reconsidered when an appeal is lodged and, in terms of section 826(c), there exists possible 
settlement of a dispute; this involves a three-step process (sections 826(a) to (c)) regarding the internal 
reconsideration of a decision. Section 827(b) also adds the alternative dispute resolution option. 
Part 3 of chapter 37 of the Control Act provides for administrative appeals. In general, an aggrieved person can 
address an appeal to the Commissioner of SARS or the official in charge of the office where the customs officer 
took the impugned decision (section 839(1)). Section 841(2) stipulates that appeals must be submitted 
electronically. A matter may only be referred for ADR if the applicant is unsuccessful in the administrative 
appeal provided for in part 3 of chapter 37 (section 848(1)). The Commissioner of SARS may also initiate the 
ADR process on own initiative (section 849), and settle disputes where it would be to the best advantage of 
the state in terms of part 5 of chapter 37. 
An interesting new concept added to South Africa’s customs law is that of “voluntary disclosure relief”, which 
has been available for some time now to other taxes administered by SARS. In essence, this allows traders the 
opportunity to voluntarily disclose underpayment in duties with the possibility of no subsequent levying of 
administrative penalties or criminal prosecution (section 864).  
Chapter 40 deals with judicial matters and is relevant during criminal proceedings initiated in the event of 
serious transgressions of this legislation. It makes the distinction between Category 1 (section 887) and 
Category 2 (section 888) offences, depending on the brevity of the transgression. Possible fines (sections 890 
and 892) can range from R500 000 to R1 000 000 and/or imprisonment from three to five years, depending on 
the category of transgression. 
 
3.3.3 The Customs Duty Act, No.30 of 2014 
 
When the Customs Duty Act enters into force, the legal provisions relating to the imposition, assessment, 
payment and recovery of customs duties on goods imported or exported from the Republic will be provided 
for in a separate piece of legislation. Currently, we have only one piece of legislation dealing with customs and 
excise matters and the payment of duties. In the future, there will be three pieces of legislation dealing with 
matters that are currently dealt with in a single piece of legislation.  
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The Customs Duty Act also has chapters dealing with administrative penalties and judicial matters. For the 
purpose of this Act, three types of penalties in terms of section 199 apply:  
(a) a fixed amount penalty - in the case of a non-prosecutable breach;  
(b) a fixed percentage penalty – in the case of a non-prosecutable breach consisting of the non- or late 
payment of duty or interest on duty; and  
(c) a prosecution avoidance penalty – in the case of a prosecutable breach. When these penalties will be 
applied is provided for in section 200: in terms of section 201, a list of four categories of non-prosecutable 
breaches must be published in a government gazette as set out below. 
Category of breach Amount of penalty 
Category A R5000 
Category B R10 000 
Category C R15 000 
Category D R20 000 
 
It is interesting to note that the above penalties for non-prosecutable breaches constitute a 100% increase on 
the penalties per category for non-prosecutable breaches as provided for in section 876(2) of the Control Act. 
In terms of section 203, a fixed percentage penalty will be imposed in the event of failure to pay what is due to 
the Commissioner of SARS on or before a specified date. This will be a percentage (10%) of the amount that 
was not paid or underpaid. Chapter 12 deals with judicial matters and is similar in essentials to chapter 40 of 
the Customs Control Act. 
 
3.4 Selected international and foreign customs penalty regimes  
Since part of this work consists of a comparative study of customs penalty regimes, what follows below is an 
overview of certain other dispensations. The European Union’s regime, in which 28 states are involved, will be 
discussed as one such example. As a regional system, its relevance for the Tripartite Free Trade Area 
negotiations currently underway (involving countries of SADC, COMESA and the EAC) will be investigated. The 
USA regime will be discussed because of its historical dominance in the western world, and the Canadian 
regime because of the Canadian influence on the writing of South Africa’s 1996 Constitution. 
 
3.4.1 The European Union 
The European Union (EU) is the world’s biggest single market or customs union, consisting of 28 countries and 
a well-established legal framework. The EU accounts for about 7% of the world’s population and, in terms of  
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world trade, generate about 20% of international exports and imports. To add further perspective, in terms of 
global imports (in 2011), the EU accounted for about 16.4%, the United states for 15.5% and China for 11.9% 
(The Economy, 2011) 
For this customs union to function effectively, the national customs laws of the member states had to be 
consolidated into one customs law for the EU. With regard to its legal framework, the customs regimes of the 
member states were first integrated in the Community Customs Code (CCC) in terms of Council Regulation 
(EEC), No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992. In terms of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
it was also recognised that, in addition to the right to appeal, traders must be allowed an opportunity to be 
heard before an adverse decision is taken against them (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 
1992, 2008). Chapter 2 of the CCC provides for the rights and obligations of persons with regard to customs 
legislation. Article 21 of the CCC lays down the principles of penalties and places this prerogative with the 
individual member states. The principles encapsulated in the CCC include the following: 
 penalties must be proportionate and dissuasive; 
 administrative penalties may take the form of a pecuniary charge or a settlement to avoid criminal 
prosecution; and 
 the cancellation, suspension or amendment of any authorisation held. 
Article 23 of the CCC provides for the right of appeal in two steps: 
 before the relevant customs authority; and 
 thereafter to a higher body, which could be a judicial authority or a specialised body. 
It must be added at this stage that the CCC does not contain any provisions for penalties for the breach of 
European customs law and that this enforcement prerogative (administrative or criminal) still lies with the 
individual member states. Plans are afoot to harmonise this aspect at a union level (see discussion below). 
During the late 2000s, the EU recognised the need to revise the CCC to incorporate new international 
obligations and, in particular, the phenomenon of electronic commerce. The Modernised Customs Code (MCC) 
had as it objective inter alia the following (Regulation (EC) No 450/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 2008): 
 the facilitation of trade and the fight against fraud by using “simple, rapid and standard customs 
procedures and processes”, 
The provisions in the MCC relating to the application of penalties and the appeals procedure did not change 
from those contained in the CCC. In 2012, the EU further decided to rename the MCC to the Union Customs 
Code (UCC) to provide for further modernisation efforts that are envisaged to become law in May 2016 
(Regulation (EC) No.952 of the European Council, 2013). 
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As stated above, although the EU customs legislation is fully harmonised in a single piece of legislation, the 
enforcement of customs breaches has, until now, been the national prerogative of its 28 members. Not 
unexpectedly, this has manifested itself in a varied approach to identical breaches (in the 28 countries), a fact 
which does not bode well for traders and the consistent administration of customs breaches in a customs 
union. The European Commission has therefore proposed a framework to synchronise customs infringements 
and align the 28 national sets of related sanctions. 
 
This process involves, firstly, an assessment of the 28 regimes and, secondly, a list of actions and/or omissions 
that will be considered as infringements of the Union's customs rules, as well as a framework for imposing 
sanctions when these occur. The EU Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment (Brussels, 
13.12.2013 SWD (2013) 514 final) sets out the findings after looking at the 28 countries’ individual regimes and 
making recommendations towards harmonising these regimes. Certain private stakeholders were also invited 
to be involved in this project and all customs administrations of member states participated. The assessment 
identifies the following four implications for the EU as a result of the non-harmonisation of its customs 
transgression regime: 
i) The EU’s international obligations: for example, Article X:3(a) of GATT 1994, requires of each contracting 
party to administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all its laws.  
ii) The management of the customs union: for example, the same customs breach has different legal 
consequences in the union member states; some member states have both criminal and administrative 
sanctions, while some only has criminal sanctions. In some member states, liability occurs when a customs 
breach occurs, while other member states require intent, negligence or elements of careless or reckless 
behaviour to be present for liability to occur.  Finally, time limits to initiate and impose a customs sanction vary 
between one and 30 years. Concerns are also raised about the negative influence of these differences on the 
collection of customs debt and its impact on the Union’s, as well as member states’, budgets.  
iii) The implementation of other EU policies: for example, the customs regime also influences other functions 
of government such as agriculture, intellectual property rights, prohibited and restricted goods, etc., because if 
problematic goods find their way into home consumption, it will be difficult to remedy the situation. Another 
consequence of this non-harmonised system is that it might lead to trade distortion, by which is meant that 
companies will choose to operate in a country where customs sanctions are less stringent.  
iv) Levelling the playing field for economic operators: the advent of the approved economic operator regime 
also created the following dilemma: the different rules of member countries mean that an entity will be 
approved or disqualified from the system in one country, but not in another, simply due to the different 
customs penalty regimes in existence (Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment SWD(2013) 




A proposal on the preferred way forward for the EU is contained in the EU directive (COM (2013) 884 final), 
also dated 13 December 2013. Various options were considered and, ultimately, the preferred option was one 
of introducing a uniform non-criminal system and leaving criminal prosecution to the individual member states 
within the framework of their existing criminal law regimes. From a practical point of view, this decision will 
manifest itself in a list of customs contraventions according to three levels of conduct and liability, viz: (i) strict 
liability; (ii) committed with negligence; and (iii) committed with intent (Directive of the European Parliament 
and of Council on the Union legal framework for customs infringements and sanctions COM(2013) 884 final, 
2013). 
In introducing the actual proposed directive, EU directive COM (2013) 884 suggest the following:  
 The list of customs contraventions includes a column indicating the possible pecuniary fine depending on 
the brevity of the transgression. The different levels of fines advance the principle of proportionality. 
What is noteworthy here is the definitions attached to the behaviours mentioned above: 
i) Strict liability: does not require an element of fault and traders are required to comply with these regulations 
without fail – therefore failure to comply with these specified requirements will result in an automatic penalty; 
ii) Committed with negligence: the subjective element (negligence) needs to be established for liability to 
arise; and 
iii) Committed with intent: intent needs to be established for liability to arise. 
It was also suggested that any person intentionally assisting with the breach of customs legislation should be 
held liable for a customs contravention. 
 Proceedings relating to a customs breach can only be instituted for a period of four years from the date 
the infringement was committed, and the enforcement of a sanction is to be limited to three years. 
 
 While criminal proceedings are underway, administrative proceedings should be suspended: the 
continuation of administrative proceedings should be in strict compliance with the ne bis in idem principle 
(legal doctrine to the effect that no legal action can be instituted twice for the same cause of action). 
 
The 21 articles of EU directive COM (2013) 884 will be briefly summarised to complete the picture of the 
proposed EU customs enforcement regime: 
Article 1 identifies the scope of the directive as being the Union’s framework of customs infringements and the 
sanctions attached to these infringements.  
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Article 2 requires member states to provide for sanctions in their domestic legislation identical to that 
provided in the EU directive. 
Article 3 lists customs contraventions in terms of which “strict liability” will apply, in other words, no element 
of fault will be considered as these contraventions will automatically elicit an administrative penalty. These 
contraventions include: 
a) failure to declare information accurately and completely on original declarations 
b) failure to ensure the accuracy and completeness of supporting documents 
c) failure to submit an entry summary declaration as required by law 
d) failure of an economic operator to keep documents and information as specified by law 
e) removal of goods from customs supervision without permission from customs 
f) similar to (e) 
g) failure to convey goods as specified by customs 
h) failure to bring goods directly into a free zone as required 
i) failure to provide documents for a customs procedure as required 
j) failure to re-export goods within the required time limit 
k) failure to have the necessary documents at hand when a customs declaration is made 
l) failure to lodge a supplementary declaration at the right place and within the required time 
m) removal or destruction of customs markings without prior permission being granted 
n) failure to discharge a customs procedure when required and within the specified time 
o) failure to export defective goods within the required time limit 
p) construction of a building in a free zone without customs authorisation  
q) non-payment of import- or export duties within the required time limit 
 
Article 4 provides for customs contraventions which member states must prove were committed with 
negligence (in order to be applicable). These contraventions include: 
a) failure of the economic operator to place non-union goods temporarily imported under a customs 
procedure or to re-export them within the required time limit 
b) failure to comply with all customs formalities required 
c) failure to comply with the obligations specified in a customs decision 
d) failure to inform customs after a decision was given of factors arising that might influence the 
continuation of that decision  
e) failure by an economic operator to present goods to customs as required 
f) failure of holder of a Union transit procedure to present goods to customs as required 
g) failure by an economic operator to present goods brought into a free zone to customs as required 
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h) failure by an economic operator to present goods to customs being taken out of the Union on exit as 
required 
i) unloading of goods from means of transport without permission from customs as required 
j) storage of goods in warehouses without the permission of customs as required 
k) not complying with warehouse obligations as required 
Article 5 provides for customs contraventions which member states must prove were committed with 
intention (in order to be applicable).  These contraventions include: 
a) providing customs with false information or documents 
b) the use of false statements to obtain a customs authorisation  
c) import or export of goods into and out of the Union without presenting them to customs as required 
d) failure of a holder of a decision by customs to comply with obligations contained therein 
e) failure of a holder of a decision by customs to inform customs of factors arising that might influence the 
continuation of that decision  
f) processing of goods in a customs warehouse without obtaining the necessary permission from customs 
g) acquiring or in possession of goods involved in a customs infringement 
Article 6 provides that Union members must take the necessary measures to ensure that inciting or aiding and 
abetting an act or omission that results in the contravention of customs legislation is treated as a customs 
infringement. Where a contravention has occurred due to an error on the side of customs, such contravention 
will not be regarded as a customs infringement (Article 7). Provision is also made for holding legal entities 
accountable for infringements in certain circumstances (Article 8). Articles 9 to 11 provide for the following 
penalties to be applied for the breach of items listed in Articles 3 to 6: 
 
Category of Infringement Penalty 
a) Strict liability infringements (Article 
3): 
 
 penalty of 1-5% of the value of the goods 
 penalty of €150 to €7500 where the infringement does 
not involve goods 
b) Negligence infringements (Article 4): 
 
 penalty of up to 15% of the value of the goods 
 penalty of up to €22 500 where the infringement does 
not involve goods 
c) Intent infringements (Article 5 & 6): 
 
 penalty of up to 30% of the value of the goods 
 penalty of up to €45 000 where the infringement does 
not involve goods 
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Article 12 stipulates factors that must be considered when customs determines the level of sanction that must 
be applied within a specific category of infringement (e.g. the amount of the evaded duty, previous 
infringements, level of cooperation from transgressor, etc.). 
Customs is precluded from initiating enforcement proceeding after four years starting from the date of the 
alleged infringement (Article 13). Administrative proceedings must be suspended when criminal proceedings 
are instituted for the same infringement and against the same entity or person. When the criminal 
proceedings are finalised, the administrative proceedings must also cease (Article 14). Article 15 deals with the 
jurisdiction of member states while Article 16 prescribes cooperation between members. Article 17 provides 
for the temporary detention of goods while a possible customs contravention is being investigated. The 
remainder of the articles (18 to 21) deal with administrative matters relating to the entry into force and 
transposition of the directive. 
 
3.4.2 The United States of America 
The second example of a foreign customs penalty regime is the one of United States of America (the USA). Its 
inclusion is justified because of the historically dominant role played by the USA in the international trade 
arena. That said, the USA’s dominance has declined over time and is now under challenge by countries such as 
China and the European Union. The focus of this study is America’s domestic penalty regime as mainly set out 
in the Tariff Act of 1930 (“the Tariff Act”) as amended (Tariff Act , 1930). 
Section 592 of the Tariff Act provides for civil penalties under the heading of penalties for fraud, gross 
negligence and negligence (the definitions of the respective terms are provided below). This classification 
helps to determine the test to be applied when officers have to decide on the appropriate penalties in the case 
of breaches of America’s customs law. Section 592(a)(1) prohibits the non-payment of duty either partially or 
in whole whether by way of fraud, gross negligence or negligence. Unlawful actions include false documents, 
false statements, omissions of a material nature, and any assistance provided in committing these unlawful 
actions. Clerical errors are not regarded as unlawful actions unless they form part of an established pattern. 
Section 592(b)(1)(A) further describes the procedure to be followed when a suspected breach has occurred. 
The relevant officer will first issue a letter of intent to raise a penalty (pre-penalty notice) to the alleged 
transgressor.  This letter of intent is comprehensive and must include the following details: 
 a description of the goods 
 details of the customs clearance document submitted to enter the goods into the USA 
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 specific legal provisions and regulations allegedly transgressed 
 the facts that constitute the alleged transgression 
 whether the alleged transgression is the result of fraud, gross negligence or negligence 
 the potential revenue prejudice as well as the anticipated monetary penalty and 
 an invitation to make written and/or oral representation as to why the proposed monetary penalty 
should not be confirmed 
The letter of intent will not be issued if the transgression relates to a non-commercial transaction or the 
proposed penalty amount is USD1000 or less. 
In terms of section 592(b)(2) the officer will, after the receipt of representations and due consideration 
thereof, issue one of two possible determinations, namely: 
 a determination to the effect that no transgression has occurred or  
 a determination in the form of a written penalty claim, including all the details as required by section 
592(b)to the effect that a transgression has occurred. The determination must inter alia include the 
findings of fact and the conclusions of law related thereto. 
The potential penalties that could be called for are provided for in section 592(c) as follows: 
Behaviour Penalty 
1. Fraud An amount not exceeding the value of the goods.  
 
2. Gross negligence An amount that is (i) the lesser of the value of the goods or four times the duties 
the US was or may have been prejudiced, or (ii) 40% of the value of the goods 
where the transgression did not affect the duties payable. 
 
3. Negligence An amount that is (i) the lesser of the value of the goods or double the duties the 
US was or may have been prejudiced, or (ii) 20% of the value of the goods where 
the transgression did not affect the duties payable. 
 
4. Prior disclosure If the person discloses a transgression before customs has embarked on a 
investigation, or the person was not aware that customs has embarked on an 
investigation, the following will apply: 
 Goods will not be seized. 
 The monetary penalty will not exceed: 
(i) where fraud was involved,  100% of the duties the USA was or may 
have been prejudiced, as well as the payment of the unpaid duties 
within 30 days of disclosure or10% of the value of the goods where the 
assessment did not affect the duties payable; 
(ii) where gross negligence or negligence was involved, interest is 
payable on the duties the USA was or may have been prejudiced. 
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It is important to note the definitions ascribed to the above behaviours (degrees of culpability) in the USA 
Customs Regulations (2014): 
a) Negligence: “A violation is determined to be negligent if it results from an act or acts (of commission or 
omission) done through either the failure to exercise the degree of reasonable care and competence expected 
from a person in the same circumstances either: (a) in ascertaining the facts or in drawing inferences 
therefrom, in ascertaining the offender's obligations under the statute; or (b) in communicating information in 
a manner so that it may be understood by the recipient. As a general rule, a violation is negligent if it results 
from failure to exercise reasonable care and competence: (a) to ensure that statements made and information 
provided in connection with the importation of merchandise are complete and accurate; or (b) to perform any 
material act required by statute or regulation”.  
b) Gross negligence: “A violation is deemed to be grossly negligent if it results from an act or acts (of 
commission or omission) done with actual knowledge of or wanton disregard for the relevant facts and with 
indifference to or disregard for the offender's obligations under the statute”.  
c) Fraud: “A violation is determined to be fraudulent if a material false statement, omission, or act in 
connection with the transaction was committed (or omitted) knowingly, i.e., was done voluntarily and 
intentionally, as established by clear and convincing evidence” (Customs Regulations, 2014).  
What is of concern at this stage is the fact that the determination of the degree of culpability (which, in my 
opinion, is a technical legality that even trained legal experts sometimes struggle to determine) is left entirely 
to the customs officer.  
Goods may be seized (section 592(c)(4)) in the following circumstances: 
 where a contravention has occurred 
 transgressor is insolvent 
 transgressor is beyond the jurisdiction of the USA 
 to protect the revenue of the USA 
 the goods are prohibited or restricted in the USA 
The goods will be forfeited to the USA unless a penalty is paid within a specified period. Before the goods are 
forfeited, a notice must be issued to indicate the reasons for the forfeiture. Section 618 makes provision for 








The third foreign customs penalty regime chosen for this study is that of Canada, mainly because the 
development and subsequent interpretation of South Africa’s “new” democratic constitution was distinctly 
influenced by the Canadian constitution and jurisprudence (Currie & De Waal, The New Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, 2001).  
The Canada Customs Act consists of 169 sections that cover approximately 180 pages, which makes it a 
relatively compact Act to work with (Canada Customs Act R.S.C, c. 1 (2nd Supp.), 1985). The main focus in this 
work will again be the enforcement provisions and the dispute resolution mechanism in the Canada Customs 
Act. 
Section 109.1 of the Canada Customs Act is very clear when it stipulates that, where any provisions of this Act 
is contravened, it will potentially solicit an administrative penalty of up to CAD25000. Section 109.3 further 
prescribes the format in which penalties must be called for and specifies that: 
 It must be done via a written assessment. 
 An assessment can be called for in addition to the seizure of the goods. 
 If the correct (usual) form of an assessment is not complied with but the substance is not affected, 
that assessment will still be valid. 
The penalty called for will be payable immediately upon service of the assessment (section 109.4), and interest 
will accrue against the unpaid penalty until it is paid in full (section 109.5). If the penalty is paid within 30 days 
after the notice was served, no interest will be charged (section 109.5(2)). 
Section 110 empowers officers to seize goods as well as the object of conveyance (truck, etc.) where, on 
reasonable grounds, they believe any provisions of the Canada Customs Act to have been contravened. It also 
empowers them to seize any goods that will assist as evidence in the prosecution of the contravention and 
requires that notice must be given of the seizure. 
Sections 153 to 159 provide for actions or omissions that are specifically prohibited and regarded as offences 
that are punishable by a fine or imprisonment or both. These acts or omissions include the following: 
 false statements and evasion of duties 
 hindering an officer in the performance of his/her duties 
 incorrect description of goods in customs documents 
 possession of blank documents that can be used in the importation process 
 opening and unpacking of goods where customs authorisation is required 
 
34 
The maximum fine that can be imposed, depending on the contravention, can be up to CAD500 000 or 
imprisonment of up to five years, or both a fine and imprisonment depending on the contravention (section 
160).  
As far as objections and appeals are concerned, section 97.48 provides that a person who receives an 
assessment may object to the assessment within 90 days from the issue date of the assessment. The relevant 
facts and reasons must be set out in the prescribed objection forms as they relate to the basis for the 
objection. If the person who lodged the objection is not happy with the outcome, he/she may lodge an appeal 
to the Tax Court of Canada within 90 days of receiving the outcome of the objection (section 97.49). Sections 
97.5 and 97.51 allow for the condonation of the late filing of an objection or appeal on application. 
Apart from the legislative framework discussed above, what is significant about the Canadian customs regime 
is the Administrative Monetary Penalty System (AMPS), which has been used by the Canada Border Services 
Agency (CBSA) since 2002. The AMPS sets out the pecuniary penalties for the breach of provisions of the 
Canada Customs Act. Following a review of the system in 2009, CBSA Memorandum D22-1-1 of 21 April 2010 
was issued. The Memorandum declares that the AMPS is a sanctions regime for the issuing of administrative 
penalties in the event of the breach of customs legislation. It contains a comprehensive list of contraventions 
and has, as one of its aims, a reduction in the seizure and forfeiture of goods as an enforcement tool in favour 
of an administrative penalty regime to deal with breaches of law.  
When a breach is encountered, the relevant legislative provision is identified and entered into the AMPS 
system, which then generates a penalty assessment; this makes the process fairly mechanical and limits 
inaccuracies (Administrative Monetary Penalty System Memorandum D22-1-1, 2010). 
Some of the recommendations in the 2010 Memorandum provide us with an insight into what the AMPS is 
trying to achieve, including the following: 
 a move away from penalties as a percentage of the value of the goods towards flat rate monetary 
penalties; 
 determining penalties amounts according to the level of risk; 
 reinstating regional penalty review committees to ensure consistent and correct application of 
penalties; and 
 grouping of contraventions according to like themes (Administrative Monetary Penalty System 
Memorandum D22-1-1, 2010). 
An important point to note is the shift away from seizing goods towards issuing a penalty to the person 
involved in the breach. This makes the collection of penalties more effective in the civil law sphere. 
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The main tool that supports the AMPS is the Master Penalty Document (MPD) (Administrative Monetary 
Penalty System Memorandum D22-1-1, 2010). This document lists the possible contraventions, with their 
penalties, legislative and regulation references and guidelines for their application. What is of note also is that 
the MPD is available on the CBSA’s website, which makes the whole process very transparent.   The system is 
progressive in nature in that second or third transgressions elicit progressively higher penalties for the same 
transgression. Only one penalty will be applied for a contravention, even where that contravention consisted 
of multiple “sub” contraventions.  
A history of contraventions for each client is kept for a period of six years. When a penalty is issued, customs 
can also seize the goods, but in very specific circumstances (such as prohibited and restricted goods, e.g., 
alcohol and drugs). In serious cases, criminal prosecution can also be instituted over and above the 
administrative penalty issued and the seizure of goods. The non-payment of a penalty constitutes a debt and 
thus will be subject to the usual civil law debt collection regime (Administrative Monetary Penalty System 
Memorandum D22-1-1, 2010). 
Memorandum D22-1-1 (2010) further explains internal administrative remedies available to traders who do 
not agree with a penalty assessment. There are two options available: 
a) a request for correction within 30 days after a seizure, assessment or demand 
A designated officer may cancel or reduce a penalty when an error was made on a penalty assessment. If the 
request for correction is refused, the trader can request an administrative review of that decision as discussed 
below. 
b) a request for redress within 90 days after date of seizure or service of a notice 
When a trader disputes a penalty assessment he/she can request a ministerial review of the decision. This 
review process is managed within the CBSA.  
In concluding this discussion of the Canadian customs penalty regime, it must be mentioned that the MPD 
provides extensive guidance to customs officers and is further augmented by an index where breaches are 















Act 2(1.3)  
 
 Person failed to keep 
electronic records in an 
electronically readable 
format for the 
prescribed period.  
 
 
1st - $150  
2nd - $225  















Person transporting goods 
within Canada that have 
been imported but have 
not been released failed to 
report, as a result of an 
accident or other 
unforeseen event, a 
damaged or broken seal.  
 
1st - $500  
2nd - $750  






(CBSA Master Penalty Document, 2014) 
 (b) Index 
No. Short Description 
 Forms 
C008  Carrier failed to use bar code for cargo control number or in the case of a CSA shipment, the 
required data element.  
C371 Carrier used incorrect carrier code.  
C005 Person failed to provide true, accurate and complete information.  
C031 Person failed to report to an officer prohibited, controlled or regulated goods in their 
possession.  
C348 Person provided false information.  
 MARKING OF GOODS  
C377 Person failed to mark the goods in the appropriate method and manner.  
 MOVEMENT AND STORAGE OF GOODS  
C033 Person moved, removed, or caused to be moved goods that have been reported but not 
released, without CBSA authorization.  
 ORIGIN OF GOODS  
C152 Person failed to furnish prove of origin. 
(Index to Master Penalty Document, 2014) 
Instead of working with an Act which customs officers are not necessarily trained for, the officer can merely 
consult the MPD by looking up the contravention that fits the particular scenario. This will immediately provide 
him or her with the corresponding legal provisions, the penalty to be imposed, and the basis on which the 
penalty must be imposed. This process is further subjected to a quality control measure in the form of the 




Chapter 4 – Results of the study 
 
The focus of this work is a study of the customs administrative penalty provisions in the South African Customs 
and Excise Act, No. 91 of 1964, and its successors.  This work includes a comparison of the South African 
system with certain foreign customs penalty regimes (the European Union, the United States of America, and 
Canada).However, a study of penalty regimes is incomplete if it does not consider the administrative appeal 
remedies available to alleged transgressors. The introduction of the Tax Administration Act in October 2012 
also added a unique dimension to how customs is administered in South Africa, given that the collection of 
internal taxes and the management of our borders falls within the mandate of one entity, namely, SARS. All 
these issues were covered in this work, and what follows is a summary of the results. 
 
4.1 The international and foreign context 
 
All the countries discussed here are members of the WTO and the WCO. They are therefore obliged to 
subscribe to the WTO regime and to their obligations as members of the WCO.  Although the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement (2013) is not yet in force, this Agreement is a good indication of the direction the international 
trading community wants trade facilitation to take.  
 
The Trade Facilitation Agreement (2013) places a great deal of emphasis, in Article 1, on transparency 
regarding customs matters, and especially transparency concerning the penalty regimes relating to customs 
infringements. Information must be easily accessible and a responsibility is placed on administrations to 
actively educate traders on these issues. An examination of the SARS website reveals that it contains no 
significant information on the South African customs penalty regime. In contrast, countries such as Canada and 
the USA have extensive information available on their websites concerning their customs penalty regimes. 
Article 4 of the Bali Agreement further suggests that administrations must provide for an internal 
administrative appeal platform, failing which traders will have the option of judicial review. It is surprising that 
an internal appeal was not incorporated as a minimum requirement, taking into consideration the costly and 
time-consuming nature of judicial review and appeals. All the countries discussed in this work were found to 
have some form of internal administrative appeal platform. 
 
The countries under discussion are signatories to the Revised Kyoto Convention (1999) and are at least bound 
by the General Annex. Chapters 9 and 10 of the General Annex prescribe the minimum standards required of 
administrations in respect of any decisions they make. According to  these standards, administrations must: 
 
 provide reasons (standard 9.8) 
 provide for internal administrative appeal (standard 10.4) 
 provide for further appeal to an independent body (standard 10.5) 
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 provide for the right to judicial appeal or review (standard 10.6) 
 
When comparing the above appeal structure to what is envisaged in the Trade Facilitation Agreement (2013), 
it would appear that responsibility to provide for internal remedies is watered down in the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement.  
 
Specific Annex H to the Revised Kyoto Convention clearly provides the standard which customs administrations 
must aspire to when it comes to customs offences. This standard includes:  
 
 specifying the period of liability (standard 4) 
 spelling out clearly the powers of customs officers  especially where they concern the search of 
persons and premises (standard 6 & 7) 
 the fact that customs breaches and the possible consequences (penalties) must be upfront and 
accessible (standard 9, 10& 22) 
 that goods must only be seized if liable to forfeiture and/or required in legal proceedings (standard 
11) 
 that the means of transport must only be seized where the owner had knowledge of the offence or 
did not take adequate precautions (standard 16) 
 
The fact that the SADC Protocol (2000) and the SACU agreement (2002) pay no specific attention to 
standardising the legal principles applicable to customs penalty regimes in the Southern African region is a 
concern.  This issue needs to be taken seriously if regional trade is to be facilitated.  
 
The following international standards or requirements form the minimum basis of a rules-based penalty 
system and can be summarised as follows: 
 
Customs penalty regime 
requirements: 
Proposed standard 
Penalty assessment  published penalty regime inclusive of possible monetary penalties 
 educational campaigns 
 provide reasons for decision plus legal provisions allegedly 
transgressed 
 seizure of goods and means of transport only in limited circumstances  
Remedies  advise on remedies available 
 allow for at least one option to an internal administrative appeal 
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4.2 The South African scenario 
 
4.2.1 The penalty regime 
In general terms, section 91 of the Customs and Excise Act determines that if any provision of the Act is 
breached, a penalty can be imposed. However, in reality, doing this is not a simple matter because, read in its 
totality, the provision is based on a complex system before a penalty can be meted out. This state of affairs 
brings with it the risk that, after all the administrative procedures have been completed, an obvious 
transgression can come to nothing because the transgressor will still have the option of whether or not to pay 
the penalty. When analysed carefully,  section 91 reveals the following:   
 





Transgressor must agree/indicate beforehand that he/she will abide by any decision 
regarding the penalty amount 
Section 91(1)(ii) 
Stage 3: 
Transgressor deposits the amount called for (or provides security) as decided in (2) 
above by SARS 
Section 91(1)(iii) 
Stage 4: 
Commissioner holds an enquiry and determines the final amount to be confirmed as a 





If the penalty is paid, no criminal prosecution will be competent thereafter. Goods may 





Theoretically, then, when a transgressor elects not to pay a penalty, it can be argued that SARS loses its 
dissuasive powers, which makes the above penalty system, in many instances, ineffective. It is also clear that 
the above system is unnecessarily complicated, which could also contribute to a penalty system being 
ineffective.  
 
As indicated above, nor is there a published penalty regime which includes reference to possible monetary 
penalties currently available on the SARS website. However, from case law it would appear that SARS customs 
officers have access to an internal penalty guideline which they must consult before deciding on an 
appropriate penalty (The Commissioner of SARS v Formalito (Pty)Ltd, 2005). Section 91(1)(iii) provides some 
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indication of the maximum penalty that could be raised, but its scope is so wide that this section is of little  
practical assistance. However, in terms of international and administrative law, as far as the standards 
discussed above are concerned, this non-availability of a published penalty regime falls short of such 
standards. Canada and the USA have such published regimes and the EU is at an advanced stage of 
implementing a comparable system. An avenue open to transgressors of the South African system is an 
application for access to information under the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000, but gaining 
such access may prove to be a cumbersome, time-consuming process which, in the face of a recalcitrant 
administration, may well end up in court. 
 
There is an indication that the new Customs Control Act will change the current section 91 process in some 
way. As we have seen, section 874 of the Control Act introduces five (5) types of administrative penalties:  
 
(a) fixed amount penalties; 
(b) prosecution avoidance penalties; 
(c) termination of seizure penalties; 
(d) withdrawal of confiscation penalties; and 
(e) missing goods penalties. 
 
Section 875 can be regarded as the general breach provision.  This section provides that the breach of any 
provision can result in the meting out of what is called a penalty for a non-prosecutable breach, or a penalty 
for a prosecutable breach, depending on the circumstances. In line with international practice, section 
876(1)(a) now requires that the responsible minister must publish a list of non-prosecutable breaches for the 
sake  of transparency. 
 
Also in line with international practice considered in this work is section 876(2), which gives an indication of 
the possible penalty that may be imposed depending on the circumstances. Three categories are listed, along 
with the applicable penalty for each category, and there is also an element of progressive increases in any 
penalty. In other words, and according to section 876(3), a penalty can be doubled or tripled if the same 
breach is committed within a period of three years.  This system of progressive increases is also comparable to 
that already practised by Canada and the USA and that proposed for the EU. 
 
Looking at the five types of administrative penalties, two issues stand out.  First, the prosecution avoidance 
penalty appears to be similar, if not exactly the same, as the current section 91 penalty as far as its usefulness 
is concerned. This may lead to the same inefficiencies as encountered with the section 91 provision referred to 
above. On the other hand, it would appear that the four-step penalty imposition process of the current section 
91, discussed above, will be done away with and should eliminate unnecessary administration.    
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Furthermore, serious criminal acts must be and can be dealt with within the scope of the criminal justice 
system and such transgressors should not be provided with the option of a prosecution avoidance penalty. 
Secondly, in line with practices discussed in this work, there should only be one penalty per transgression. The 
proposed termination of the seizure penalty, the withdrawal of confiscation penalty and the missing goods 
penalty, lend themselves to a practice where the penalty (or, in this case, the penalties) meted out do not fit 
the crime and may therefore become totally disproportionate. 
 
In the execution of their daily tasks, South African customs officers are confronted with other legislation 
administered by SARS in the form of the VAT Act and the TA Act. Section 7 of the VAT Act requires customs 
officers to collect VAT on all importations. The penalty regime as it relates to VAT is now governed by the TA 
Act, which also governs all other tax acts administered by SARS, excluding the Customs and Excise Act. It makes 
administrative sense to consolidate all administrative matters relating to the tax acts administered by SARS 
into one piece of legislation and in a single system in order to promote uniformity, legal transparency and 
certainty. The fact that the Customs and Excise Act was excluded from the application of the TA Act does not, 
therefore, make sense, whatever the reason proffered for its current exclusion.  The consequence of this 
exclusion now appears to result in a situation where the customs officer needs to operate within a 
“duopolistic” system, two systems that, at present, do not speak to each other. 
 
Section 213 of the TA Act requires that, whenever there is a non-payment or under-payment of tax (e.g. VAT) 
when it was required to be paid by the particular tax act, a percentage-based penalty as prescribed by the 
relevant tax act must be imposed (for the late payment). Section 39 of the VAT Act currently prescribes this 
percentage to be 10% of the amount not paid or under-paid. This appears to be an example of the application 
of strict liability. This is not the end of the matter, though: as section 222 requires that, in addition to the 
section 213 penalty, an understatement penalty is also to be imposed.  Understatement is defined in section 
221 of the TA Act as “any prejudice to SARS or the fiscus in respect of a tax period ...”Section 223 provides for 
an understatement percentage penalty table that must be utilised by officers in determining the appropriate 
understatement penalty. This creates the risk of a practice of disproportionate penalties, besides the fact that 
the complexity of the system will inevitably lead to an inconsistent application of the law. 
 
From the above it is clear that the customs officer is currently potentially confronted with two penalty systems 
when dealing with breaches of the Customs and Excise Act. 
 
4.2.2 The appeal regime 
 
In terms of chapter XA of the Customs and Excise Act any standard case will have at least two opportunities to 
be considered should the alleged transgressor not agree with the decision of the customs officer. After a letter  
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of assessment has been issued the trader will have 30 days from the date of issuance to lodge an appeal in 
terms of the rules to the Act. If the trader is not in agreement with the outcome of the appeal, he/she can 
lodge a request for alternative dispute resolution. An alternative dispute resolution is not a further appeal, but 
merely an attempt to resolve the matter administratively before potentially proceeding to judicial review or 
appeal. The aforementioned remedies are in line with international obligations as well as the practices of the 
countries discussed in this work, with the exception of minor differences that will be discussed in more details 
below. 
However, here too the customs officer operates potentially in a duopolistic system because, concerning 
collecting penalties on VAT, the TA Act prescribes a different system of remedies available to the trader. 
Chapter 9 of the TA Act describes a different system of dispute resolution, depicted in table form below, a 
system that does not apply to the Customs Division of SARS. 
 
Dispute resolution process in terms of the TA Act Legal provision 
Step 1: 




 Appeal against the outcome of the objection 
 Depending on the amount involved or the issues at stake the matter will 
be referred to the Tax Board (chaired by an attorney or advocate) or the 
Tax Court (presided over by a judge). 
 By mutual agreement SARS and the taxpayer may try to resolve the matter 
by way of alternative dispute resolution – the appeal will be kept in 










 If SARS or the taxpayer does not agree with the outcome of the Tax Board, 
they can refer the matter to the Tax Court who will hear the matter de 
novo. 
 The Tax Courts is a court of record. 
 An appeal of a decision of the Tax Court must be placed before a full 








In addition to the above process, part E of chapter 15 also allows for a remittance of penalty process – 
arguably before an objection is lodged in terms of section 104.  This, coupled with the process set out in the 
table above, creates an evolved process of remedies available to taxpayers not currently available or 
applicable to transgressors of the Customs and Excise Act. The question therefore arises why SARS, as a single 
organisation, has allowed such diverse systems to be applicable to transgressors of the tax laws of one  
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country. A speculative take on this question may suggest that a decision was taken that the Customs Division 
was not ready to deal with a new legislative regime and that the new Customs Acts would address this 
”duopolistic” state of affairs. 
 
4.3 The selected international scenario 
 
4.3.1 The penalty regime 
 
European Union 
The Community Customs Code (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992) provides the 
legislative platform for all customs matters applicable to all 28 members of the EU with the exception of 
enforcement matters, which still reside with individual member states. Plans are at an advanced stage to 
provide for a union customs enforcement legislative framework that will be applicable to all 28 member states. 




A list of contraventions with possible pecuniary penalties at different levels which will be based on the brevity 
of the transgression and the rate of recurrence. 
 
b) Applicable test  that will determine liability  
i) Strict liability: does not require an element of fault and traders are required to comply with these regulations 
without fail – in other words, no element of fault will be considered as these contraventions will automatically 
elicit an administrative penalty. 
ii) Committed with negligence: negligence needs to be established for liability to arise. 
iii) Committed with intent: the subjective element (intent) needs to be established for liability to arise. 
iv) Any person intentionally assisting with the breach of customs legislation will also be held liable for a 
customs contravention. 
 
c) Liability period 
Four (4) years from the date of infringement. 
 
d) Penalty amount 





Unites States of America 
Section 592 of the Tariff Act (Tariff Act , 1930) sets out the customs legislative framework which, as augmented 
by various official publications, help traders to understand the system. 
 
a) Format 
Compliance with the Tariff Act is required and no list of contraventions with possible pecuniary penalties exists 
to assist customs officers and traders. 
 
b) Test applicable that will determine liability: 
i) Negligence – failure to exercise the degree of reasonable care and competence expected from a person in 
the same circumstances. 
ii) Gross negligence – an act or acts (of commission or omission) done with actual knowledge of, or reckless 
disregard for, the relevant facts and with lack of concern to or disregard for the obligations under the Tariff 
Act. 
iii) Fraud – occurs when a material false statement, omission, or act in connection with the transaction was 
committed (or omitted) knowingly, i.e., was done voluntarily and intentionally, as established by clear and 
convincing evidence(Customs Regulations, 2014). 
c) Liability period 
Five (5) years from the date of infringement. 
 
d) Penalty amount 




Canada has a well-developed customs administrative penalty regime in the form of the Administrative 
Monetary Penalty System (AMPS) (Administrative Monetary Penalty System Memorandum D22-1-1, 2010). 
 
a) Format 
The AMPS lists the possible contraventions, with the applicable penalty, legislative and regulation reference 
and guidelines for its application. 
 
b) Applicable test  that will determine liability 
Any failure to comply with customs related legislation (strict liability). 
 
c) Liability period 
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Six (6) years from the date of infringement. 
 
d) Penalty amount 
Flat rate monetary penalties are issued on a progressive system informed by rate of occurrence and brevity of 
transgression. 
 
4.3.2 The remedy regime 
 
European Union 
Article 23 of the CCC provides for a right of appeal in two steps, the one before the relevant customs authority, 
and the other thereafter to a higher body (which could be a judicial authority or a specialised body). 
 
Unites States of America 
Under section 618 of the Tariff Act, the trader can request the mitigation or remittance of the amount of the 
penalty issued. Section 592(e) provides for judicial review where the matter will be decided de novo. The 
burden of proof regarding the violation lies with the state. 
 
Canada 
Section 97.48 of the Canada Customs Act provides that a person who received an assessment may object to 
the assessment within 90 days from the issue date of the assessment. If the trader who lodged the objection 
does not agree with the outcome, he/she may lodge an appeal to the Tax Court of Canada within 90 days of 
receiving the outcome of the objection (section 97.49). Sections 97.5 and 97.51 allow for the condonation of 
















Chapter 5 – Discussion 
To reiterate: this work focuses on a comparison of the customs penalty regimes in South Africa and certain 
other countries. It was found that South African administrative penalty provisions, as set out in the Customs 
and Excise Act, the new Customs Control Act and the Tax Administration Act, showed similarities with and, to a 
lesser extent, dissimilarities with those regimes of other countries. These similarities and dissimilarities will be 
discussed further below. The following table provides an overview of certain aspects of the comparison:  
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The table above clearly shows that, as far as the format of the penalty regime is concerned, two out of the 
three foreign regimes have chosen to augment their primary legislative provisions with a publicised penalty 
guideline. This is in line with requirement 9 of Special Annex H of the Revised Kyoto Convention (1999). The 
AMPS system of Canada and the proposed EU list of contraventions (EU directive COM (2013) 884) are 
examples of such a penalty guideline; both these guidelines are available to external parties, which is in line 
with the principle of transparency and effectiveness. At present, neither South Africa nor the USA has such a 
system and it is up to the customs officer to decide on an appropriate penalty rather than using a published 
guideline.  South Africa is in the process of planning to introduce a list of non-prosecutable offences with 
penalty categories, in accordance with section 876 of the Control Act of 2014. From a practical point of view, 
this is a step in the right direction, and one that is in line with international obligations. This type of system 
should make the work of the customs officer easier as far as the determination of the appropriate penalty is 
concerned. It also provides traders with clarity about the consequences of breaching the relevant customs 
legislation. 
 
When considering the three pieces of South African legislation in the above table, it is clear that an 
administrative penalty will be meted out when a mere transgression (action or omission) of the relevant 
legislation occurs. This is also true of Canadian customs legislation. Legislation in the EU and USA also requires 
an evaluation of the behaviour that caused the transgression, to see if the behaviour was aggravated by, in the 
case of the EU, negligence or intent and, in the case of the USA, negligence, gross negligence or fraud. The 
degree of behaviour will then determine what level of administrative penalty will be meted out or, 
alternatively, whether the transgression meets the criteria for criminal prosecution. From a practical point of 
view and from personal experience, it is submitted that is unrealistic to expect a customs officer to detect the 
contravention and also to establish whether the transgression was, for example, committed with intent or 
with an element of gross negligence. These two standards form an integral part of a criminal or civil case 
where a delictual claim has to be argued by highly trained attorneys. To expect this level of judgement from a 
customs officer on a daily basis is totally unreasonable.  
 
This is why, in the case of customs legislation, the principle of strict liability would be a more practical option, 
since failure to adhere to customs legislation would automatically elicit an administrative penalty. More 
serious breaches will, obviously, be subject to criminal prosecution. The proposed EU penalty regime suggests, 
in Article 3 of EU directive (COM 2013) 884, a list of contraventions that will automatically elicit an 
administrative penalty. This concept, combined with an extensive list of transgressions as found in the 
Canadian APMS document, is the most practical solution for customs administrations today. The basis for this 




transgression and the monetary penalty for each transgression.  The focus will also be on the transgression 
rather than on the goods (unless the goods fall into the category of prohibited or restricted goods, dangerous 
goods or are smuggled goods which – will then render them liable for seizure).  What this also suggests is that 
goods should not be detained for each and every investigation, since this will have dire economic 
consequences for the business concerned and, progressively, for the economy as a whole. Nothing prevents a 
customs administration from administratively, criminally or, in terms of civil law, prosecuting a legal entity or 
individual after a prima facie case has been established; in none of these cases does the customs 
administration have to hold  on to the goods themselves. 
 
It is further argued that the current South African customs penalty regime, with its main component being 
section 91 of the Customs and Excise Act, cannot be an effective deterrent for potential transgressors owing to 
its voluntary or non-binding character. The TA Act, with its strict liability (in the form of section 213), which 
strongly resonates with the Canadian customs penalty model, constitutes a much better model as far as 
penalties are concerned.  The proposed penalty regime in the Control Act that will eventually replace the 
Customs and Excise Act is a welcome start, but is unnecessarily complex in that it suggests five types of 
administrative penalties. As argued above, the focus should be on the transgression and not the goods, unless 
the transgression falls within a certain category of transgression. Termination of seizure penalties, withdrawal 
of confiscation penalties and missing goods penalties are pointless if the goods can be released at a later stage 
against the payment of a ransom amount.  The same argument will apply to the prosecution avoidance 
penalty. If a transgression is serious enough, it should be criminally prosecuted; other transgressions that do 
not fall in this category must be punished with an administrative penalty which, if not paid, will constitute a 
debt to the state. 
 
In terms of determining the monetary value of penalties, all the regimes studied use some form of calculation 
method. It is suggested that, where an amount was underpaid or not paid, that the penalty should be a fixed 
percentage of the amount underpaid or not paid, as currently applied in the TA Act and suggested in the 
proposed EU regime. All other breaches where no potential monetary prejudice is at stake must elicit a 
specified penalty (flat rate) on a progressive scale based on the number of breaches for the same 
transgression. This system has been operating in Canada for a number of years and is now written into South 
Africa’s Control Act, as well as the proposed EU penalty regime. The attractiveness of this system is that it can 
be applied consistently and easily by customs officers; it is also a transparent system for both customs and 
traders alike.  
 
As stated earlier, it is surprising that the Trade Facilitation Agreement of 2013 left a door open to 
administrations concerning the availability of an internal administrative appeal mechanism. Article 4 of the 
Agreement provides that, where such internal avenue is not available, recourse must be had to judicial review 
or appeal. It is submitted that this section should have been more prescriptive in nature, setting an internal  
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administrative appeal mechanism as a requirement.  This argument is put forward in view of the prohibitive 
cost of litigation and the uncertain timeframes surrounding litigation. The Revised Kyoto Convention, in 
standard 9.8 in the General Annex, is more forthright here and states that national legislation must provide for 
an initial appeal to the relevant customs administration. It goes even further in standard 10.5 (also in the 
General Annex) and states that provision must be made for a further appeal to a body independent of the 
customs administration (not judicial appeal or review), where the applicant is not satisfied with the outcome 
of the internal administrative appeal. 
 
All the countries discussed in this work provide for at least a two-level internal review and/or appeal process, 
except the USA, which has a one-level internal process that can be followed by a judicial process. The current 
South African customs scenario relating to appeals appears to have a ”duopolistic” character, given that one 
customs breach can potentially elicit two channels of appeal. This is because an import declaration can 
potentially contain a duty component as well as a VAT component payable to SARS in one transaction. If there 
is an non-payment or under-payment of duty and VAT in one transaction, this involves not only the Customs 
and Excise Act, but also the VAT Act and, from 1 October 2012, also the TA Act.  
 
What the above means, in practical terms, is that if the trader elects to appeal a penalty imposed in terms of 
the Customs and Excise Act (related to duty) and to a penalty imposed in terms of the TA Act (related to VAT), 
he/ she will have two appeal channels: this is because the Customs and Excise Act prescribes one process and 
the TA Act another. It is suggested that the solution to this conundrum would be to make the TA Act applicable 
to customs and excise legislation in terms of administrative penalties.  The appeal process contained in the TA 
Act is more sophisticated than that prescribed in the Customs and Excise Act and also complies more closely 
with international customs obligations. The appeal process contained in the TA Act makes provision for: 
 
i) internal objection 
ii) internal appeal/ADR 
iii) appeal to an independent  body (Tax Board/Tax Court). 
 
When the above remedies have been exhausted, the trader has the option of further judicial review or appeal. 
There is no reason why the more evolved appeal process prescribed in the TA Act cannot be made applicable 








Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
What is evident, going back to the days of the Laws of Manu (Asakura, 2003), which contained the earliest list 
we have of a customs penalty regime, is that the fundamental nature of customs law enforcement has not 
changed, in essence, over the centuries. We are still grappling with the question of which system leads to the 
most effective compliance and enforcement regime. The organising of international trade through institutions 
such as the WTO and WCO has greatly helped us to move towards a clear, rules-based international trading 
system, one that creates certainty and stability and that contributes to the advancement of trade facilitation. 
 
The aim of this work was to analyse and compare various penalty regime systems in an effort to ascertain 
whether the respective systems would improve or worsen trade facilitation. 
 
In terms of international best practices, the author of this dissertation believes that the Canadian 
Administrative Monetary Penalty System (AMPS) provides us with the best guidance. Its extensive list of 
contraventions, together with the legislative reference and penalty suggestions, meets the requirements of 
transparency and certainty as prescribed in international instruments such as the Revised Kyoto Convention 
and, subsequently, the Bali Agreement. 
 
The proposed EU penalty regime as contained in EU Directive 883 (2013) is similar in most respect to Canada’s 
AMPS, but with the difference that the EU system proposes various categories of liability instead of sticking to 
“strict liability”, and it is the latter which, I believe, is the most effective. International trade is, by its very 
nature, fast-moving; as such, it requires simple but effective penalties for those who transgress customs 
legislation. A system that provides for a list of breaches with the related monetary penalty based on the 
principle of strict liability is best suited to international trade.  
 
As it stands, the current South African scenario is over-complex and not geared towards effectively addressing 
breaches via an administrative penalty system.  This is partly due to the absence of the principle of strict 
liability in the system: as has been made clear throughout this work, section 91 of the Customs and Excise Act 
is worded such that it leaves transgressors with a choice.  The current situation is further complicated by the 
non-existence of a single penalty and appeal regime dealing with the different taxes within SARS. The current 
situation means that the rules pertaining to customs duty are provided for in the Customs and Excise Act 
while, for VAT, another set of rules apply (those contained in the TA Act). More work will have to be done to 
synchronise these discordant legal issues.  It is suggested that there already exists a good legislative framework 




The new customs legislation also appears to be moving towards a more practical and effective penalty regime. 
The introduction of fixed amount penalties follows the Canadian model, and this new legislation will be based 
on the principal of strict liability. How extensive this fixed amount penalty list is will determine the success of 
the new system. 
 
This list will also go far in terms of compliance with international obligations such as transparency and 
certainty, which is not the case with SARS’s current customs penalty regime. The current customs appeal 
system complies with international obligations, although challenges exist in view of the fact that more than 
one system is currently available for one customs transaction where both customs duty and VAT apply.  As 
mentioned before, the appeal system contained in the TA Act is an international benchmark which should be 
expanded to include the customs environment.  
 
The implications for South Africa are quite clear if the current penalty system is not transformed: it will 
perpetuate an ineffective law enforcement regime.  This is exacerbated by the fact that, within SARS, more 
than one penalty and appeal system is found, one for customs and another for other taxes such as VAT and 
income tax. Research possibilities therefore exist in the South African context to develop a more effective 
administrative penalty system. Further research could include a comparison of the administrative penalty 
regimes of any number of members of the WTO and the WCO. Based even on the very limited comparative 
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